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for judicial station.

The truth is, and it is quite time it should

be plainly spoken, that the court, whether through its fault or its
misfortune, has been an actor in several scenes which have impaired public confidence in it as a judicial tribunal. We have
called the Surratt trial a judicial farce-it was a farce, but of that
melancholy kind at which thoughtful people do not laugh; and
the disgust which was felt at the trial of Mary Harris, in the
same court, is still fresh in'the professional mind.
Trials at the Old Bailey, or The Tombs, and kindred courts,
are always the occasions on which judicial and forensic proprieties are most ignored, but it is particularly unfortunate when a
court which descends to the Old Bailey style, bears a title so
similar to that of the great tribunal whose reputation is of national importance. We hope that Congress will speedily change
the name of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, so
that the Supreme Court of the United States, already menaced
with sufficient dangers of its own in the perilous field of legal
politics, shall not be loaded with any additional burdens of popular distrust.
J. T. M.
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
LORIN PALMER v. GEORGE S. HARRIS.
A trade-mark having upon it a false statement which did not, and could not produce any effect upon the purchasers of the article, is nevertheless so tainted by the
falsehood that equity refuses to protect it.
A trade-mark for a brand of segars, manufactured in New York, had upon it, in
Spanish, words, which interpreted into English, mean: "Factory of segars from
the best plantations de ]a Vuelta Abajo, calle del Agun, Habana." Equity refused, on the ground of the falsehood, to enjoin a printer from counterfeiting the
devicd, and supplying the trade with his imitations.

THIS was an appeal from a decree of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia, which refused to grant an injunction to
restrain Harris from counterfeiting Palmer's trade-mark.
The facts were that Palmer, a dealer in segars, designed a label
for a particular brand which he manufactured, and which had
acquired an extensive popularity in the United States as the
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" Golden Crown."
The label contained a golden crown surrounded by a green wreath, and underneath this the words,
"FABRICA

DE TABACOS DE LAS MEJORES VEGAS,
DE LA VUELTA ABAJO,

CALLE DEL AGUA,

No. 73,

HABANA."

Harris, the defendant, printed an imitation of the design, containing the same words, and supplied dealers in the segar trade
with the counterfeits, and thus enabled them, by attaching the
imitation to their own segars, to avail themselves of the reputation
which Palmer had acquired, and deprive him of the exclusive
use and benefit of his trade-mark. Palmer's design was copyrighted under the Act of Congress, February 3d 1831, 4 Stats.
436, § 1. The imitation was not denied, but the defence was, that
the segars being made in New York, the label contained a false
and fraudulent representation, which equity would not protect.
The court below dismissed the bill.
James Parsons, for the appellant.-A trade-mark is a species
of property (Bradley v. Norton, 33 Conn. 157), and entitled to
protection (Colladay v. Baird,4 Phila. 139; Burnett v. Phalon,
11 Tiff. (N. Y.) s. c. 3 Tr. App. 167), by injunction against one
who imitates the trade-mark so nearly that a purchaser might be
misled; a substantial similarity is sufficient: Bradley v. Norton,
supra; Coats v. H1olbrook, 2 Sand. Oh. 586, and cases cited; Taylor v. Carpenter, Id. 603, s. c. in error 611; Partridgev. K-euck,
Id. 622; Williams v. Johnson, 2 Bosw. 1; Stokes v. Landgraf 17
Barb. 608; Arnoskeag ManufacturingCo. v. Spear, 2 Sand. S. C.
599; Wolfe v. Gouland, 18 How. Pr. R.; Clark v. Clark, 25
Barb. 76; Brooklyn White Lead Co. v. Masury, Id. 416; Walton
v. Crowley, 3 Blatch. C. C. 440.
The assertions on the label are in a foreign language, and the
law presumes, until the contrary is proved, that they were not
understood, at least when to assume that the statements were
comprehended would charge the person who uttered them with
liability: 2 Starkie on Slander 52; Cook on Defamation, pp.
14, 87.
If the words were understood, positive knowledge of what he
was buying was nevertheless brought home to every purchaser,
and their effect neutralized by, 1st. Palmer's public declaration
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that he was a citizen or permanent resident of the United States,
and consequently that the segaxs which he manufactured were a
domestic product, involved in taking out a copyright of his
design: Casey v. Collier, 56 Niles' Reg. 262, Judge BETTS, 1839;
Keene v. Wheatley, 9 Am. L. R. 45, Judge CADWALADER, 1860.
2d. The internal revenue and customs regulations. The internal revenue stamp on the box of segars states the kind, quantity, date of inspection, collection district they are manufactured
in, and the inspector's name: Act of Congress, July 13th 1866;
Boutwell's Manual, p. 51, § 91. And the law imposes upon the
purchaser, under a penalty, the duty of ascertaining that the inspection has been made: Id. § 92.
3d. The requirement, which excludes the possibility of mistake,
that imported segars must be inspected and stamped before removal from public store or bonded warehouse: Act of Congress,
July 28th 1866, Stats. at Large, 1865-6, p. 828.
The assertions, therefore, are innocent in the effect which they
produce upon the public. In Bdelsten v. Vick an article was
described as "patented," which signified that it was protected by
a patent, though the patent had, in fact, expired. Vice-Chancellor WOOD drew the inference that the dealers in the trade knew
that the term had expired, and were not injured by the falsehood;
he did not enter into and canvass the motive which induced the
plaintiff to assert the untruth: 11 Hare 78, 1853.. And in Dale
v. Smithson, the plaintiff put upon his trade-mark a fictitious
name as that of the manufacturer of the article. The court decided that, as the public was not in fact deceived, the plaintiff was
entitled to their protection: 12 Abbott Pr. R. 237. Until a purchaser has been deceived, no act has been done which gives the
law a pretext to interpose. A naked intention to deceive is not a
ground for legal action of any kind-least of all for the infliction
of a penalty or forfeiture. Intention by itself, unembodied in an
act, does not come within the purview of jurisprudence; it is only
when coupled with an act that it becomes an important element in
determining its character: 2 Austin's Jurisprudence 147; Lord
MANSFIuLD, R. V. Scofield, Cald. 897; B. v. Higgins, 2 East 5;
Lindley, Juris. xxx., 2; ,Smith v. Bowler, Disney, Rep. 520-26.
Equity lends its aid to make a legal right more effectual: Farina v. Silverlocek, 6 De G. M. & G. 214; s. c. 89 E. L. & E. 514,
1856. If the title is contested, equity suspends its aid until the
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legal right is established: Piddingv. How, 8 Simons 477; Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Doug. 293 ; Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beavan 66. This is
the practice; under liberty granted by Vice-Chancellor WIGtAM,
Bodgers v. Nowill was tried in 1848: 5 M. G. & Sc. 109.
A test case at law by the purchaser against the proprietor would
require a false representation by the proprietor, his knowledge of
its falsity, ignorance on the part of the purchaser that the representation was false, and his acting upon it in the belief that it was
true, and injf1ry resulting from such action: Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B.
& C. 541, 1824; s. c. 5 D. & R. 292; Singleton v. Bolton, supra;
Crayshaw v. Thompson, 4 M. & G. 357, 1842; Bodgers v. Nowill,
'sura; Behn v. Kemble, 7 C. B. N. S. 260 ; Eden on Injunction,
by Waterman, 25, note 1.
There can be no deception until somebody is deceived: 1 Starkie
on Evidence 374; Adams's Equity 176 and note; Story's Equity,
§ 191, 20-3; Broom's Maxims 358.
When the legal title is established at law, as in Stewart v. Smithison, 1 Hilt. 119, equity enforces the right: Dale v. Smithson, supra
which is vested, and can be forfeited only on legal ground. It is
better fortified than the right to a contract which equity rescinds
only when an action of deceit could be maintained at law: Sugden on iProperty, in H. of L. 597-8-9, 406-8, 64 L. L. 398-9;
Sugden on Vendors 180, ch. 5, § 111, pl. 41; 204, ch. 5, § 5, pl.
3; Fry on Specific Performance, ch. xii., p. 191; xiii., 206, L. L.
100.
The result of the broad proposition that a false statement vitiates
the title would be, 1st. To forfeit in this kind of property, though
in no other, a man's title, for the slightest taint of fraud.
2d. To give the benefit of this penalty to a confessed pirate, in
spite of the Act March 8th 1855, Pamph. L. 514, Purd. Dig.
1155.
3d. To put outside the pale of law property which has at any
time been falsely represented in the market, and thus the object
of law, to preserve society from internal disorganization, is, to the
extent of this excluded property, frustrated.
Theodore Cutyler, for appellee.-Protection is asked from a court
of equity for a tradesmanl's label which is confessedly false, and
both calculated and intended to deceive and mislead the public.
It is gravely argued that this label, however intended, does not
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in fact deceive, because of the words obscurely printed below,
"Entered according to the Act of Congress."
So, too, it is said the law requires an imported article to have
itpon the boxes certain marks of inspection, the absence of which
Crom these boxes shows the label is untrue, and prevents it from
.eceiving the purchaser.
But the motive is still present, and the fact too, even if this be
so-that the unwary and the ignorant are, in fact, deceived and
intended to he deceived.
The authorities upon this question are very clear and well
settled.
Mr. Daniels, speaking of trade-marks, says: "With respect to
these cases, it may lastly be observed, that the remedy given in
equity is discretionary, and will be withheld if there has been any
improper conduct on the part of the plaintiff. On this principle
the court has refused to grant an injunction, in the fist instance,
where the plaintiff has made false representations to the public
concerning the article which he seeks to protect :" 3 Daniel's Ch.
Practice, p. 1755; and again, p. 1754: "He cannot, therefore,
be allowed to use names, marks, letters, or other indicia, by which
he may induce purchasers to believe that the. goods which he is
selling are the manufacture of another person."
2 Story's Eq. § 951 ; Perty v. Truefit, 6 Beavan 66 ; Millington
v.Fox, 3 Al. & K. 338; Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 112; Hogg
v. Kirby, 8 Yes. 226; Walcott v. Walker, 7 Id. 1; Pidding v.
Hrow, 8 Simons 477.
[MR. JUsTIcE READ.-There is a recent case decided upon this
point by the House of Lords, which has not been mentioned, The
Leather Oloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., 11 H. L. 523.]
In Towle v. Spear, 7 Penna. Law Journal 176, the United States
Circuit Court refused to protect by injunction the manufacturers
of quack medicines. A court of equity will not protect worthless
articles, or countenance fraud or immorality.
Parsons, in reply.-The Leather Cloth Co. v. The Amnerican
Leather Cloth Co., cited by Mr. Justice READ, was decided upon
the point of similarity; the resemblance was not sufficiently close
to make the defendants' stamp a colorable imitation.
There is no doubt that courts of equity refuse to protect quack
medicines and noxious drugs: Woodruff v. Smith, 48 Barb. 438;
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but in such cases no attempt is or could be made to anticipate and
counteract the evil effect; the antidote does not accompany the
poison. But in this case it is demonstrated that the assertion
never in a single instance produced any effect.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, J.-The plaintiff, according to the statements of
his bill, is the manufacturer of a cigar, known as the " Golden
Crown," and he has devised a trade-mark, which he uses in its
sale. le charges that the defendant, who is a printer by trade,
has counterfeited this mark, and sells copies of it to persons engaged in the manufacture and sale of cigars, by whom they are
used to his damage. The answer of the defendant admits these
allegations; but sets up as a ground for the non-interference of
the court, that the articles thus sold by the plaintiff were manufactured in the city of New York, and that the trade-mark in
question contains upon it the declaration that they are the product of a "factory of cigars from the best plantations de la
Vuelta_Abajo, Calle del Agua, Habana." The case having been
heard on bill and answer, the bill was dismissed with costs.
The maxim which is generally expressed, "He who comes into
equity must come with clean hands," Snell's Principles 33, but
sometimes, in stronger language, " He that hath committed
iniquity shall not have equity," Francis' Maxims 5, has been
often applied to bills to restrain by injunction the counterfeiting
of trade-marks. The ground on which the jurisdiction of equity
in such cases is rested, is the promotion of honesty and fair dealing, because no one has a right to sell his own goods as the goods
of another: Croft v. Day, 7 Beavan 232. "It is perfectly manifest," said Lord LANGDALE, "that to do this is a fraud, and a
very gross fraud." It is plain that there is no class of cases to
which the maxim referred to can be more properly applied. The
party who attempts to deceive the public by the use of a trademark, which contains on its face a falsehood as to the place where
his goods are manufactured, in order to have the benefit of the
reputation which such goods have acquired in the market, is
guilty of the same fraud of which he complains in the defendant.
He certainly can have no claim to the extraordinary interposition
of a tribunal, constituted to administer equity, for the purpose
of securing to him the profits arising from his fraudulent act.
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Thus, in Pidding v. How, Simons 477, the plaintiff had made a
new sort of mixed tea and sold it under the name of "Howqua's
Mixture ;" but as he had made false statements as to the teas of
which his mixture was composed, and as to the mode in which
they were procured, the court refused an injunction; Vice-Chancellor SHADWELL remarking, "it is a clear rule laid down by
courts of equity not to extend their protection to a person whose
case is not founded in truth." In lavel v. Harrison,10 Hare
467, an injunction was refused, when an article was sold by the
name of Flavel's Patent Kitchener, for which there never had
been a patent. In Leather Cloth Company v. American Leather
Cloth Company, 11 House of Lords Cases 583, though decided
on the ground that the mark used by the defendants was substantially different from that of the plaintiffs, yet it may be fairly
inferred from all the opinions that, if necessary, the decree of
Lord Chancellor WESTBURY would have been affirmed on the
broader ground. Thus, a company which had gained reputation
by a particular manufacture, on discontinuing their business,
transferred their stamp or trade-mark, which indicated them as
the manufacturers, to other parties; and it was the opinion expressed that such assignees would not be protected in equity in
the use of that mark on goods manufactured by themselves.
"So," said Lord CRANWORTH, "in the cases of bottles or casks
of wine stamped as being the growth of a celebrated vineyard, or
cheese marked as the produce of a famous dairy, or of hops
stamped as coming from a well-known hop-garden in Kent or
Surrey, no protection would be given to the sellers of such goods,
if they were not really the produce of the place from which they
purported to come." It is contended, however, that this case is
different, because there were marks or words used with these
labels inconsistent with the idea that they were held forth as
manufactured in Havana. On the label is printed, "Entered
according to Act of Congress, A. D. 1858, by Lorin Palmer, in
the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of New York." Apart
from the fact that this is in such very small type, and so abbreviated, that it would probably escape the observation of every one
whose attention was not specially directed to it, a circumstance
which rather strengthens the evidence of an intention to mislead
the public, what is there in the fact that the designi or engraving
had been copyrighted in the United States, inconsistent with the
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declaration that the cigars, contained in the box, were manufactured in Havana of Cuban tobacco ? But, again, it is said that
the United States internal revenue stamp would at once undeceive the purchaser, there being a difference between the stamp
used for articles imported and for those of domestic manufacture.
Few persons would stop to notice this difference; and besides, as
it is alleged, the trade-mark is pasted on the inside of the lid, and
when the box is open for the purpose of retailing, the trade-mark
is brought directly in the view of persons wishing to purchase,
and the revenue stamp is not seen unless the lid is turned down,
and the box examined on the outside. It is contended, further,
'that the falsehood is in a foreign language, of which it is to be
presumed that the plaintiff's customers are ignorant. Yet there
is certainly enough to convey to every one, who can read, that
the cigars are from "Havana."
It is true, that when a slander
is uttered in a foreign tongue it is necessary, in an action for
damage, to prove that the hearers understood the language; for
it will not be presumed that, being ignorant of the meaning of the
words, they afterwards repeated them to those who understood
them: 2 Starkie on Slander 52; but there is no such rule in an
action for a libel in a foreign language, for litera serpta manet;
that may be read and explained by those who do, to those who do
not understand it. The case of a written or printed libel has a
much closer analogy to the point before us than that of spoken
slander. But above all this, it is not necessary that any one person has been actually deceived or defrauded; it is enough that it
is a misrepresentation, calculated to have that effect on the unwary and unsuspicious.
Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed at the costs of the
appellant.
The right to a trade-mark was recognised at an early period in the English
law. In Southern v. Bow, decided in
the 15th year of James I., Mr. Justice
DODERIDGE cited a case in the time of
(Queen Elizabeth, which lhe thus stated:
"An action upon the case wasJrought in
the Common Pleas by a clothier,--that,
whereas he had gained great reputation
for his making of his cloth, by reason
whereof he" had great utterance, to his

great benefit and profit; and that he
used to set his mark to his cloth whereby
it should be known to be his cloth; and
another clothier perceiving it, used the
same mark to his ill-made cloth on purpose to deceive him; and it was resolved
that the action did well lie :" Popham
143-4. The different versions of this
case are compared in a note at the foot
of page 388 of 4 1. & G.'s Reports.
It is only, however, within a compara-
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tively recent period that the employment
of trade-marks has become a general
usage. And this increase in the employment of them has, without doubt, arisen
from the new use to which trade-marks
are at present applied. They no longer
serve simply to identify the article upon
which they are placed; they also serve
as advertisements; and it is the facility
with which they can be used as a medium
to advertise and bring the article into
notoriety, that causes them to come into
such general vogue.
It is remarkable, in view of this popular characteristic which trade-marks have
acquired, that Palmerv. Harris should
be the first case of the kind decided by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which has, as yet, been published.
I. As the report of the principal case,
taken with the opinion delivered in it,
turnishes a full r~sum6 of the points
which were presented for adjudication,
and were decided by the court, it is unnecessary to recapitulate them. Especially is this the case when every position which was taken to parry the application of the general principle to the
particular facts in hand, was effectually
turned by the breadth of the proposition
which was enunciated. The eminent
judge thus sums up the doctrine in the
last sentence of his opinion: "But
above all this it is not necessary that
any person has been actually deceived
or defrauded ; it is enough that it is a
misrepresentation calculated to have that
effect on the unwary and unsuspicious."
The word "1calculated" in this sentence
thus taken out of its context, is ambiguous, but restored to its place in the
opinion, it mcans, if it is to have any
force whatever, that the party designed
to misrepresent, and that it is entirely
immaterial whether that design was
frustratedl or carried into effect. Though
it remain a naked intention, never executed, the penalty is the same as if the
design were realized, and a purchaser
VoL. XVII.-10

were deceived. The meaning of the
phrase might be thus rendered: It is
unnecessary that any person has been
deceived or defrauded by the misrepresentation, it is enough that there was an
intention to deceive, though it be demonstrated that the intention was never
executed, but always remained a bare
notion. This is a broad proposition which
deserves consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the
proprietor of the trade-mark has a vested
right of property at law, and can assert
his legal title against any invader upon
his domain. No counterfeiter or pirate
can contest his title on the ground of its
being a fraud upon the public; the only
person who is permitted at law to raise
this objection is the purchaser who has
been deceived, and he can recover damages only to the amount he has actually
suffered in consequence of the deception.
The anomaly is then presented of a perfect .legal title, which might, under the
Pennsylvania Statute of March 8th 1855,
be asserted for the purpose of putting
the counterfeiter in prison, and subjecting -him to a heavy fine in addition,
being forfeited in a court of equity for
the benefit of the counterfeiter.
The Roman maxim, Boni judicis
ampliare jurisdictionem, has certainly
been acted upon persistently in this class
of cases. The chancellors originally
did not presume to decide upon the
validity of the title; they referred that
question to the courts of law, and during
the interval whilst awaiting a determination they suspended their action.
This was the origin of the jurisdiction
which now overshadows the law. Mr.
Justice HILTOx, in an interesting historical review of the authorities, has
traced the development of this trunk of
equity jurisdiction back to its original
bulb, and tried, though in vain, to
arrest its future expansion: Dale v.
Smithson, 12 Abb. Pr. R. 237.
Lord WESTBURYn, WhO is not content
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to judge men's conduct, but must needs
pass sentence upon the motives which
they entertain but do not act upon, is
the champion for immaculate purity.
e
He says: "Wh re any symbol or label,
claimed as a trade-mark, is so constructed or worded as to make or contain a distinct assertion which is false, I
think no property can be claimed in it;
or, in other words, the right to the exclusive use of it'cannot be protected.
The sale of the article stamped with a
false statement is pro tanto an imposition
4pon the public; and, therefore, in the
case supposed, the plaintiff and the defendant would be both in part delicto."
To the objection that'any buyer of ordinary discernment would perceive the
falsehood, and therefore would not be
deceived by the statement, he replied:
"I cannot receive it as a rule either of
morality or equity that the plaintiffs are
not answerable for a falsehood because
it may be so gross and palpable that no
one is likely to be deceived by it. If
there is a wilfully false statement, I will
not stop to inquire whether it was too
gross to mislead."
And he accordingly
held that the plaintiffs, who had bought
out the Crockett International Leather
Cloth Company and had made use of
their stamps which reasserted the names
of the original manufacturers, the place
of their manufactory, and asserted the
facts which were untrue, that the cloth
was tanned, and the process by which this
was done had been patented, could not
prevent the defendants from using the
same trade-mark, as the plaintiffs were
condemned by the principles to which
they appealed: The Leather Cloth Co.
(Limited) v. The American Leather Cloth
Co. (Limited), 33 L. J. R. (1864) 199.
The present Lord Chancellor, HATHEERLY, takes the view that motives or
intentions, unless they are incorporated
in an act and thereby produce an effect
upon somebody to his detriment, do not
come within the vision either of a court

of law or equity. In illoryan v. MeAdam, the plaintiffs applied the term

patent to crucibles which had never been
patented. In delivering the opinion he
justifies his decision in Edelsten v.
rick, saying: "Where a person uses
the term ' patent' in a manner which is
innocent,-by which I do not mean innocent in the inmost recesses of his
mind (for, of course, I cannot consider
whether or not these gentlemen supposed
they had a patent when in truth they
had none at all), but innocent in the
effect it may produce upon the public;what the court must consider is this,
how far in protecting him in assuming a
title which he has no right to assume,
the public are likely to be deceived."
He very properly refuses to draw the
inference of fact that no one was deceived, and states the reason which discriminates the case from Eddstenv. Vick,
where he did draw the inference of fact:
"I cannot assume in the plaintiffs'
favor that everybody who bought these
articles must be taken to have such
knowledge of the trade that he would
know at once that there never had been
an English patent respecting it, because,
if that is so, why was that term ever
adopted at all ?" 36 L. J. R. Ch. (1867)
228. The position taken by the present
Lord Chancellor accords with the received opinion that neither courts of law
nor of equity are courts of casuistry.
This has heretofore been considered a
fundamental principle of jurisprudence,
and Austin, a great authority on the
abstract and elemental principles of law,
states the proposition with his accustomed strength and clearness : " Intention is not of itself wrong, or breach of
duty or obligation, nor does it of itself
place the party in the predicament of
guilt or imputability. In order that the
party may be placed in that predicament
his intention * * must be referred
to an act, forbearance or omission of
which it is the cause:" 2 Jurisprudence

PALMER v. HARRIS.
147. It has been the constant boast of
English and American lawyers that our
system of law did not attempt to judge
the conscience of mankind, and this
abstention was vaunted as an indication
of our advance in intelligence. The
endeavors of the church, during the middle ages, to reduce the impulses of the
conscience to a set of formulas, resulted
in such a perversion of reason and justice that the world abandoned the delusive scheme. Could Chief Justice Ginsox return to his illustrious seat, how
startled would he be at the overthrow of
what he considered the grand chaiacteristic of his favorite science, the prac,
tical wisdom which judges men by their
actions and not by their thoughts I
This question becomes more important
in consequence of the habit, which is
now very general, of using the trademark as a medium of advertisement.
Its primary object is to identify the article ; to indicate where, by whom, and at
what manufactory it was manufactured.
But its secondary purpose is to declare
in an announcement, which is published
on the trade-mark, the character of the
article. It is the peculiar hardship of
the decision rendered in the principal
case to forfeit the established and vested
right to a trade-mark for the slightest
misrepresentation. Such severity is not
enforced in any other branch of equity;
on the contrary, in the case which furnishes the closest analogy to the forfeiture of a trade-mark, the rescission of a
contract, equity refuses to deprive a
party of his contract unless a case has.
been made out upon which an action of
deceit could be maintained at law.
This, it will be observed, is the rescission
of a contract for the benefit of the party
who has been deceived, and yet,, even
between the parties, equity requires a,
legal ground for the destruction of the
legal title. This is consonant with the
original doctrine of equity in regard to
trade-marks; it suspended its action

until the law had pronounced a decision,
and then it lent its aid to make the
legal right more effectual.
It is true that slighter grounds will
move a court of equity to refuse to carry
out, than will induce them to set aside
a contract. And as they decline to formularize the reasons of their non-action
in the case of a request to enforce the
speicific performance of a contract, it is
unsettled what range of considerations
they take into view; though it is generally asserted that they limit their attention to the mutual rights of the two
parties before them. If this be the extent of their vision, the administration
of substantial justice between the parties
can certainly excite no animadversion,
nor can it furnish a parallel for the forfeiture of -a legal right which no one
injured has contested, and on the hypothesis assumed by the learned judge, if
not proven by the facts, no one is in the
position to contest, as no one could be
injured.
II. The learned judge who delivered
the opinion of the court, placed the
jurisdiction of equity upon the ground
of fraud.
His language is: "The
ground oA which the jurisdiction of
equity, in such cases, is rested, is the
promotion of honesty and fair dealing,
because no one has a right to sell his
own goods as the goods of another:
Croft v. Day, 7 Beavan 232. 'It is
perfectly manifest,' said Lord LAxGDALE, ' that to do this is a fraud, and a
very gross fraud.'" This was, perhaps,
the received opinion in the time of Loi d
LANGDALE, but it has long since been
exploded. Lord CANWORTIT, in 1856,
stated the ground to be the inadequacy
of the legal remedies, and the duty of
equity to administer preventive justice
in order to make more effectual the legal
right: Farinav. SilrerlocZ, supra. This
dictum of Lord LA2 GDALr, was cited
with approval by the Vice-Chancellor
who originally heard the ease of the
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Leather Cloth Company, and this resus-

citation led Lord

WESTBURY

to exert

his strength and put an end to the
theory. His demonstration is such a
neat piece of reasoning that it deserves
to be known, independent of the important principle which it establishes. He
says: "First, the goods of one man
may be sold as the goods of another
without giving.to that other person a
right to complain, unless he sustains or
is likely to sustain from the wrongful act
some pecuniary loss or damage. Thus,
-in the case of Clark v. .Flceman, 11
Bear. 112, the eminent physician, Sir
James Clark, applied for an injunction
to restrain a chemist from publishing
and selling a quack medicine under the
name of ' Sir James Clarke's Consumption Pills ;' but the court refused to interfere because it did not appear that Sir
James Clarke had sustained anypecuniary
injury. Secondly, it is not requisite for
the exercise of the jurisdiction that there
should be fraud or imposition practised
by the defendant at all. The court will
grant relief although the defendant has
no intention of selling his own goods as
the goods of the plaintiff, or of practising any fraud either on the plaintiff or
the public. If the defendant adopts a
mark in ignorance of the plaintiff's exclusive right to it, and without knowing
that the symbols or words so adopted
and used are current as a trade-mark in
the market, his act, though innocently
done, will be a sufficient ground for the
interference of a court, as is plain from

the decision of Lord

COTTEN A

in the

case of Millingtoa v. Fox, to which I
entirely assent, and from the learned
Vice-Chancellor's own opinion in the
case of Welch v. Knott, 4 Kay & J. 747,
751. Imposition upon the public, occasioned by one man selling his goods as
the goods of another, cannot be the
ground of private action or suit. In the
language of Lord TnUnLow, in Webster
v. Webster, 3 Swanst. 490 n., fraud upon

the public is no ground for coming to
this court. It is indeed true that unless
the mark used by the defendant be applied by him to goods of the same kind
as the goods of the plaintiff, and it is in
itself such that it might be, and was,
mistaken in the market for the trademark of the plaintiff, this court will not
interfere, because there is no invasion of
the plaintiff's right; and thus the mistake
of the buyers in the market, under which
they, in fact, take the defendant's goods
as the goods of the plaintiff, that is to say,
imposition upon the public, becomes the
test of the property in that trade-mark
having been invaded and injured, but it
is not the ground on which the court
rests its jurisdiction.
"The representation which the defendant is supposed to make, that his
goods are the goods of another person,
is not actually made otherwise than by
his appropriating and using the trademark which such other person has the
exclusive right to use in connection with
the sale of some commodities; and if
the plaintiff has an exclusive right so to
use any particular mark or symbol, it
becomes his property for the purposes
of such application, and the act of the
defendant is a violation of such right of
property, corresponding with the piracy
of copyright or the infringement of a
patent. I cannot, therefore, assent to
the dictum that there is no property in a
trade-mark. It is correct to say that
there is no exclusive ownership of the
symbols which constitute a trade-mark
dpart from the use or application of them,
but the wotd ' trade-mark' is the designation of marks or symbols when applied to a vendible commodity, and the
exclusive right to. make such user or
application is rightly called property.
"The true principle, therefore, seems
to be, that the jurisdiction of the court
in the protection given to trade-marks
rests upon property, and that the court
interferes by injunction because that is
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the only mode by which such property
can be effectually protected. The same
things are necessary to constitute a title
to relief in equity in the case of the infriugement of the right to a trade-mark
as in the case of the violation of any
other right of property. First, the
plaintiff must prove that he has an exclusive right to use some particular mark
or symbol in connection with some
manufacture or vendible commodity;
and secondly, that this mark or symbol
has been adopted or is used by the defendant so as to prejudice the plaintiff's
custom and injure him in his trade or
business :" 33 L. J. R. Ch. (1864) 199 ;
Hall v. Barrows, 33 L. J. R. (1864)
204, 207-8.

Millington v. Fox is so well established that a compromise with the proprietor of a trade-mark by a brickmaker who had used it unwittingly at
the instance of a customer, was considered the settlement of a legal liability, and the customer was compelled
to reimburse him the amount of his expenditure: Dixon v. Fawcus, 3 E. & E.

(1861) 537.
Had the learned judge in the principal
case viewed the trade-mark as a right
of property, it may be doubted whether
he would have been prepared to go the
length which Lord WESTBURY went,
and forfeit the title on purely moral
grounds.

J.P.

Supreme Court of Vermont-Ceneral Term, Nov. 1868.
DANIELS v. NELSON.
The doctrine of fraud in law as applicable to change of title in personai property
without change of possession is merely a kind of rule of evidence prescribing what
facts proved shall be held to conclusively show the existence of fraud, and thus
creating a kind of estoppel in pals.
Tie rule rests upon grounds of policy only, and its application has been limited
to creditors and bond fide purchasers. It does not apply in favor of a state or
county levying a tax.
Therefore, a chattel belonging to A. cannot be levied upon for a tax due by B.,
although it formerly belonged to B. and still remains in his possession.

Tars was replevin of a mare that was distrained by the defendant on a tax-warrant for a poll-tax against the plaintiff's father,
that being the only tax against him. The County Court found
the legal title to the property to be in the plaintiff, as between
him and his father, by a contract made in good faith, and not
fraudulent in fact. But the court further found and held that
the ostensible ownership and possession were so far in the father
as to render the mare subject to levy for the tax, even if she
would not have been if the plaintiff had taken and kept the exclusive possession and claim of title in himself.
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Hleath

2eed, for plaintiff.

.Redfield and Gleason, for defendant.
Opinion delivered by
J.-The question is directly presented, whether
the doctrine of fraud in law is applicable in this case, so as to
subject the property to the levy made. The several English
statutes, the substance and spirit of which are embraced in our
own, on the subject of fraudulent conveyances, are designed to
protect creditors and bond fide purchasers; and the fraud, which
gives occasion for those statutes, looks exclusively to such creditors
and purchasers; and, moreover, they contemplate actual fraud,
both in intent and act. The doctrine, persistently adhered to
in Vermont, of fraud in law, does not give any additional scope
either to the statutory or common-law operation of fraud. That
doctrine works in subordination to such law, and adopts a particular mode of determining the existence of the vitiating fraud
in the given case. In a sense, it propounds a kind of rule of evidence, prescribing what facts proved shall be held to show the
existence of such fraud. It says to the party-Prove that there
was no visible change of substantial, exclusive possession from
the vendor to the vendee, and the fraud required by the law to
invalidate the sale as against creditors and bond fide purchasers
will be established.
In many of the states, and, at some periods, in England, the
lack of such change of possession has not been allowed to have
such conclusive effect; but has constituted matter of circumstantial evidence bearing on the question of actual fraud. The conclusive effect of that fact in this, and some other of the states,
has been allowed and adopted as matter, and on the ground, of
policy. When the ground and reason of that policy is considered,
the proper extent of the application and operation of the doctrine
itself will be seen.
Possession-the holding and using of an article of property in
the manner of an owner-is a strongly evincive badge of ownership; and when it continues to be exercised upon property by the
person who had in fact before owned it, the public and individuals
would be warranted in presuming that such ownership was continuing, and in acting accordingly, without making inquiry. Indeed, very few persons would think of making inquiry. as to a
BARRETT,
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change of title, unless some apparent change in the possession and
use of the property had occurred.
The ownership of property being a leading ground and inducement for credit, as well as for confidence, in dealing with and
trading for it, in order to preclude the continued possession of
property from inducing an unfounded credit, or leading to a fallacious confidence in making a purchase, the law adopts a kind
of conclusive estoppel in pais, in favor of creditors and bond fide
purchasers of the former owner, his continuing in the possessi6n
and use in a manner consistent with his continuing still to be the
owner of it.
It does this in order, at once and entirely, to relieve the subject
of the continued possession of property by the former owner, as a
ground of credit and confidence, from the embarrassment that
would be likely to, and often does, result from having to settle
occult questions as to the real character of transactions between
the parties to the pretended transfer of title, when not accompanied by a corresponding change of possession.
In this view it may be regarded as a kind of rule of title and
assurance in the pretended vendee. The propriety of the rule is
well justified by commercial, as well as by judicial, experience;
and we may properly continue to abide by it, as intimated by
Judge IATTOCKS, in Farnsworth v. iShepard, 6 Vt. Rep. 521,
notwithstanding the doubt expressed by Chancellor KENT in
his Commentaries, Vol. 2, p. 526 (ed. of 1840), in noting with
commendation that intimation.
Now it is obvious that the policy and final cause of the rule
cannot be predicated of the case in hand. The party to which
the tax is owing is not a creditor. The state, the town, the school
district, do not give credit by way of trust and confidence. They
make an authoritative and arbitrary exaction, and are armed with
all the power of the state for its enforcement out of any, and all,
of the property of the party taxed, extending even to the enticement of the prison walls, in lack of the property whereof to get
satisfaction. In Johnson v. Howard and Trustee (Orange Co.,
March Term 1868), it was held that town taxes could not be
deducted in diminution of the liability of the town as trustee of
the defendant, under sec. 52, ch. 34, Gen. Stat.
In the present case, as before remarked, the tax was not on
account of any property. It was only a poll-tax ; that fact itself
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indicating it to be likely enough that, not property, but only the
person of the party taxed, might be reached by warrant for its
compulsory collection.
The view we take of the subject, in its reasons, as developed in
its history, is fully sustained by the text-books and the cases. 2
Kent's Com., from p. 515 .,, 552, inclusive, contains the best
summary of the law of th,. dtject that I have seen. It will be
found that all the cases in Vermont, beginning with lMfott v. MfeNiel, 1 Aik. lRep. 162, and ending with H1ouston v. 1oward, 39
Art. Rep. 55, treat the matter of fraud in law-constructive fraud
-predicated upon a lack of change of possession, as originating
iii policy, and limited to creditors and bond fide purchasers without notice. The doctrine has never been better stated, both as to
its grounds and its limit, and its practical operation, than it was
by HuTCHINSON, J., in lliott v. Me-N'el; and it has not been de1parted from in point of principle in any subsequent case that has
come to our attention. He says: "A sale of personal property,
without change of possession, though it may be valid, as between
the parties, is void as to creditors. It is usually termed a fraud
in law. * * * This must be a visible substantial change; so that
the possession will no longer give a credit to the former owner.
* * *
If a man actually owns and possesses personal property,
the world have a right to presume he remains the owner, so long
as he retains the possession. People may well give him credit on
account of this property, and when they attach it for his debts,
they can hold it."
The ground of the doctrine is strongly developed in -oster v.
eGregor, 11 Vt. 595, by BENNETT, J., in which it was held
that property exempt from attachment and execution was not
subject to the rule of fraud in law, for the reason that it did not
enable the vendor to acquire a false credit, nor was it against
sound policy, as opening a door to fraud; and yet such property
is not exempt from distress upon a tax-warrant.
As the present case does not fall within the reason of the doctrine and rule, and as no precedent is shown for applying the rule
to such a case, we see no legal reason for subjecting the plaintiff's
property to the compulsory payment of his father's poll-tax. No
party in interest has been misled. No party in interest could be
misled in such a case, by such possession and use of the property
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by the plaintiff's father, with the knowledge and permission of the
plaintiff, as were shown in this case.
The fact tliat the defendant levied on it, because of such possession and use, is no element in the law of the subject. It was
an experiment on his part to get the tax satisfied. What gives
potency to the lack of a change of possession, is its tendency to
induce a false credit in the creation of claims against the former
owner, who still continues in possession,-not that it may induce
a party to levy final process upon it in satisfaction of his cfaim.
The case, in this respect, bears a close analogy to one feature of
Turner v. Waldo, 40 Vt. Rep. 51.
The judgment below is reversed, and judgment rendered in this
court for the plaintiff.
The foregoing opinion is certainly
reasoned with great fairness and clearness, and as the rule of law declared is
one of policy, not altogether dependent
either upon principle or analogy, it is
difficult to form any very decided opinion
in regard to its absolute soundness. It
is a question resting too much in the
discretion of the court to admit of much
controversy, either in regard to its wisdom or its logic. By presuming to
affirm the contrary one assumes to erect
his own judgment in opposition to that
of the court, which, within its sphere, is
final and therefore infallible. That is
all that is fairly implied in the infallibility of any person or tribunal, that its
judgments are final and not subject to
revision. And where, in addition to
the judgment of any court being final,
it is made to rest upon so undefinable a
basis, as policy, it becomes impossible to
measure its soundness, since we have no
common standard of policy in the law
until it has been established by common
consent, which is not the fact as to the
matter in hand.
It may be true that the person or power
in whose favor a tax is assessed is not to
be regarded strictly in the light of a
creditor of the tax-payer. So too a
party upon whom a tort is committed,

before judgment in his favor, is not entitled to the benefits of being regarded as
a creditor of the tortfeasor. He could
not avoid the effect of a conveyance
made for the express purpose of avoiding his claim, which would be void
under the statute against fraudulent conveyances as to creditors. And he could
not claim to recover a penalty inflicted
against debtors for fraudulent conveyances, to be recovered only by creditors.
This point as to the claimant for damages in tort being entitled to the benefit
of the provisions of the statute against
fraudulent conveyances was so determined at an early day in Connecticut by
a divided court: Fox v. till, 1 Conn.
295; Fowler v. Frisbie, 3 Id. 321.
But after a tort goes into judgment it
becomes a debt, and we see no good reason why the relation of debtor and creditor may not fairly be regarded as
thereafter existing between the parties to
such judgment. -That is expressly decided in Pelhlan v. Aldrich, 8 Gray 515,
in regard to a bill of costs recovered by
defendant in a writ of entry.
Ve think, indeed, that no one can
question that the sheriff may levy an
execution issued upon ,a judlgment in an
action of tort, upon personal property
not so transferred as to vest the title as
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against creditors. We do not think any
court would be inclined to make any
distinction between the rights of judgment-creditors on the ground of the original cause of action. This rule of law,
regarding the sale of personal property
as incomplete until after a visible substantial transfer of possession to the
vendee, is for the security of officers as
well as creditors, that there may be some
known evidence- of title by which they
may be able to determine the duty which
the law imposes, as to levying on it.
Whether the same rule should be extended to officers making distress for
taxes is perhaps not equally clear. The

English rule in regard to distress is far
more sweeping than in regard to the
levy of a fieri facias. A distress
attaches to all property in the possession
of the party in default. That is certainly so in regard to distress for rent in
arrear, and there is no reason why the
rule should not extend to distress for
taxes. The distinction made in favor
of creditors in the principal case may be
founded upon valid considerations. But
we generally feel averse to making distinctions in the law, unless upon grounds
which commend themselves to the comI. F. R.
mon mind.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
MOBILE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO. v. THOMAS.
It is not the absolute duty of a railroad company to furnish a safe engine. Its
duty is to use care and diligence to furnish such an engine.
When an .injury has occurred to a servant in consequence of a defect in an
engine, the burden is on the servant to show negligence in the master, and it is
not shifted by the fact that an injury has resulted from a defect.
Notice to the proper officers or servants of the company is notice to the company,
and will render it liable unless it uses proper diligence in repairing the defect; bat
if it has made an effort by a competent servant to repair, it is not liable. Failure
to remedy the defect does not conclusively prove negligence on the part of the
workman, and if it did, lie is a fellow-servant of the plaintiff, for whose negligence
the company is not liable.

THE defendant in error, who was plaintiff below, was a fireman
in the railroad company's employ. While on duty on a train, the
engine broke down from some defect in itself, and the plaintiff
was injured. Evidence was given at the trial tending to show
that the engine, which was run on a "Mason side-bearing truck,"
was of a kind known to be unsafe; that this particular one had
broken down several times before, and that the assistant-superintendent and master mechanic of the shop had been informed of
this when it occurred.
The defendant offered evidence that the side-bearing truck was
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safe, and that the foreman of the workshop, a competent mechanic,
had repaired this engine, and pronounced it safe.
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff under a charge
which is sufficiently set oat in the opinion of this court.
Geo. .. Stewart and P. Hamilton, for appellant.
Robert H. Smith, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
A. J. WALKER, 0. J.-The first charge given by the court below
was as follows: "It was the duty of the defendant to have on the
road suitable and proper engines, and to keep them in such condition that unusual risks would not attend those who were employed
to perform service on them; and if they did not in this case have
such an engine, and the plaintiff was ignorant of any defect in
the engine, the burden is on the defendant to show that they used
due caution and diligence in the matter." The defendant was
liable to its servants for injuries resulting from its negligence.
When passengers on a railroad are injured in consequence of a
defect in any instrument employed by it, it is a presumptiondisputable, but not conclusive-that the injury resulted from
negligence: 2 Redfield on Railways 190, § 11; H. & S. Railroad
Co. v. Higgins, 5 Am. L. Reg. 715; s. c., 1 Redfield on Railways 533, § 131; Edgerton v. N. Y. Railroad Co., 85 Barb.
193; Curtis v. R. & S. Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. 534. But the
same principle does not prevail in reference to servants of a railroad, as we shall see. The established doctrine of the law unquestionably is, that the onus of prioving negligence is upon the servant: 2 Redfield on Railways 200, § 15; Perkins v..E.BRailroad
Co., 29 Maine 307; s. c., 1 Am. Railway Oases 144. Our own
decision in III & 0. Railroad Co. v. Jarboe (not yet reported),
and Steel & Burgess v. Townsend, 37 Ala. 247, are not opposed
to that proposition. In those cases, the question was, whether a
loss of goods, or injury to them, was within an exception to a
contract of affreightment; and it was held that the onus of proving that the loss or injury came within the exception, was upon
the common carrier; that it did not fall within the exception,
unless due care and diligence had been used, and that therefore
the onus of proving such care and diligence was upon the carrier.
The charge here, however, was not that the onus of proof of
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care and diligence was upon the defendant, but that it was vctst
upon it by a failure to have a suitable and proper engine. It
bases the proposition that the onus of proof is shifted to the
defendant, upon the assumption of its absolute duty to have a
suitable and proper engine, as contradistinguished from its duty
to use due and proper care and diligence to have such engine.
Does the law impose upon a railroad corporation such absolute
duty to its servants, or does it only impose the duty of using due
diligence to ha.ve a suitable and proper engine ? If the former
question be answered in the affirmative, then the defendant guarantees absolutely to its servants the proper quality of all its
engines, and it is liable notwithstanding the utmost care and diligence is used. We can perceive no reason to support the conclusion that the badness of the engine could create the presumption
of negligence, and have the effect of shifting the onus of proof
from the servant to the carrier. If the assumption that it was
the absolute duty of the defendant to have a suitable and proper
engine be correct, then the court has made an unmerited concession to the defendant, in only deducing the inference that the
onus of proof was changed. Upon that assumption he should
have drawn the inference of an unqualified liability-and in that
view the charge would be too favorable to the defendant, and he
could not object to it. Error, therefore, in the charge is shown,
and shown oirly, by maintaining the proposition that the defendant's obligation or duty to its servant was discharged by the exercise of due and proper diligence to have and to keep suitable and
proper engines. To impose upon the master a liability for injuries
to the servant, resulting from causes against which due care and
diligence fail to provide, absolves the servant from the risks necessarily incident to the business in which he is engaged. There are
perils incident to the servant's employment against -which caution
and prudence cannot perfectly guard. Those perils and risks the
servant must be presumed to know as well as the master, and
when he contracts he must be understood to assume them, and
stipulate for compensation proportioned thereto. It is in that the
relation of a railroad corporation to passengers differs from its
relation to servants. The principle has been so often declared
both in England and in this country, that it has ceased to be disputable. Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, the leading case upon
the subject, is in reference to the liability of a master to a servant
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for any injury received during his transportation upon the master's
wagon. Lord ABINGER, in deciding the case, omitting a qualification which seems to have been since engrafted upon the rule, said:
"No duty can be implied upon the part of the master, to cause
the servant to be safely and securely carried, or to make the
master liable for damage to the servant, arising from any vice or
imperfection unknown to the master, in the carriage or in the
mode of loading and conducting it." The later English cases of
Seymour v. laddox, 5 E. L. & E. 265, and Cough v. St~el, 24
Id., are to the same effect. In the latter of those cases, it was
decided that the owner of a ship was under no obligation to a
seaman serving on board, for the seaworthiness of the vessel, and
was not liable to the seaman, in the absence of any knowledge
of the defect, or personal blame of the master. larshall v.
Stewart, 33 E. L. &E., distinctly recognises neglect as the ground
of the master's liability to his servant. In the recent case of
Wiggit v. Pox, 36 E. L. & E.'486, we infer that the doctrine of
Priestly v. Fowler, as above stated, was recognised. In America,
the earliest case touching the subject is lt1urray v. Bailroad Co.,
1 MllMullen 386, where the liability of a railroad corporation to
a servant for an injury received when on its cars was denied, unless
there was fault in the master. In Farwell v. B. W. B. C., 4
Metcalf 49, which is the leading American case in reference to
the relation of-railroads to their servants, the .precise question
of the liabilities of a railroad to its servants, for an injury arising
from a defective locomotive did not arise, and Chief Justice SHAW,
who delivered the opinion, withheld any expression upon the subject. In the later Massachusetts case of Seaver v. B. d- J31..Railroad, 14 Gray 466, the question arose and was decided in a per
curiam by a court over which the same learned judge presided.
The court below had ruled that a railroad was not responsible for
an injury to a servant, resulting from a defect in a locomotive
unless there was a want of due and reasonable care to provide a
safe and suitable engine. The appellate court affirmed, remarking that the instructions to the jury were sufficiently favorable to
the plaintiff: 1 Redfield on Railways 530, § 10. This case arrays
the authority of the highest court of Massachusetts, including the
great name of Chief Justice StrAw, in faior of the proposition
that the railroad is not liable in such case, unless there was a.
want of reasonable care. In Buzzell v. Laconia fanuf. Co., 48
Maine 113, it was ruled (a servant having been injured in conse-
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quence of a defective bridge) that the master's liability depended
upon the negligence and want of care, and the declaration was
held defective for the lack of an averment that the insufficiency
of the bridge was known to the defendant or would have been
known but for the want of proper care and diligence. In Noyes
v. Smith, 28 Vermont 59, there was an injury to an engineer
resulting from a defect in an engine. It was decided that there
does not arise from the relation of master and servant, the duty
of furnishing an engine, well constructed and safe, to the engineer,
and that where there is no actual notice of defects in an engine,
and no personal blame exists on the part of the master, there is
n6 implied obligation on his part that the engine is free from defect
or that it can safely be used by the servant. See also to the same
. & C. Railroad Co., 82 Vermont 478. In
effect, Hard v.
Keegan v. W. "..Co., 4 Selden 175, the liability for injury to a
servant, caused by a fault in an engine, was placed upon the
established fact of negligence and misfeasance, and the distinction
heretofore stated between passengers and servants is declared.
There are a number of other decisions in New York to the same
effect. Wright v. N. Y. C. Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 562, reviewing the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 28 Barbour
80, refers the master's liability to his misconduct or negligence,
and in relation to defects in machinery says, knowledge must be
brought home to the master and proof given that he was ignorant
of the same, through his own negligence and want of proper
caution-in other words, it must be shown that he either knew, or
ought to have known, the defect which caused the injury: see also
Byron v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 26 Barb. 89. In Ohio the rule is, that
the master is liable on the ground of neglect, or want of 'care and
diligence: ie atrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566, 575. In Pennsylvania, the proposition that there is a duty, or implied guaranty
of the master to the servant, of the suitableness and safety of the
instruments furnished, is denied: Ryon v. C. V. .ailroad, 23
Penn. 384. And lastly, this court itself has decided the question
in hand. In Perryv. Marsh, 25 Ala. 659, it announced its opinion as follows:." In ordinary cases where a workman is employed
to do a dangerous job.or to work in a service of peril, if the danger belongs to the work he undertakes, or the service in which he
engages, he will be held to all the risks which belong either to the
one or the other; but where there is no danger in the work or
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service by itself, and the peril grows out of extrinsic causes or
circumstances, which cannot be discovered by the use of ordinary
precaution and prudence, the employer would be answerable precisely as a third person if the injury or loss was occasioned by his
neglect or want of care." The perils of service are in this extract
divided into two classes, for one of which the master is not responsible at all, while for the other class, in which the peril from a
defective engine may be reckoned, he is responsible in the absence
of ordinary precaution and prudence. This decision is alsb supported by the statement of the law in the older case of Walker
v. Bolling, 22 Ala. 294.
We obtain the following conclusions from the foregoing collation of authorities: It is not an absolute duty of a railroad to
furnish a suitable and safe engine. It is its duty to use due care
and diligence to furnish such engine. When an injury has occurred to a servant, in consequence of a defect in an. engine, the
burden is upon the. plaintiff to show negligence, or the want of
care and diligence in the defendant corporation. The onus of
proof is not shifted to the defendant by the fact that an injury
has resulted from the defect. The first charge being inconsistent
with these propositions is erroneous.
The proposition of the second charge is, that if the plaintiff's
injury was caused by a defect in the engine, not known to him,
of which defendant's servants, charged with the duty of receiving
notice of such defects, and remedying the same, previously had
notice, and if such servants being so notified had previously repaired the engine, but failed to remedy the particular defect,
above stated, the defendant would be liable. This charge is obviously correct in assuming that notice to the servants, who were
agents of the defendant to receive notice of defects in the engine,
would affect the defendant with notice, if it designated one or more
servants to receive such notice for itself, upon an established principle of law, notice within the scope of the agency, to the agent,
would be equivalent to notice to the principal: Smith v. Oliver, 81
Ala. 39; Wiley Banks & Co. v. Knight, 27 Id. 336; Mfundine v.
Pitts, 14 Id. 84. The propriety of this portion of the charge,
however, is also questioned in reference to the allegations of the
complaint. It is contended that under the complaint, ihe defendant can only be charged on account of a neglect, which consisted
of a failure to remedy a defect, which it would have known but for
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the want of propercare and liligqence, and not on account of negligence, consisting in a failure to remedy a defect of which it was
legally informed. This question we leave undecided, because we
doubt in reference to it, and on another trial it can be easily
avoided by adding another count to the complaint.
Another objection made to this charge is, that it subjects the
defendant to liability for a failure of its servants, who repaired
the engine, to remedy the defect. The inference of the defendant's liability from such failure of its servant, can only be sustained by the maintenance of the two propositions, that negligence
of the servant is a legal conclusion from such failure, and that the
master is responsible for the negligence of the servant. If the
failure to remedy the defect does not conclusively demonstrate
negligence, the proposition of the charge is not correct. If it
does demonstrate negligence, still the proposition of the charge
is erroneous, unless the master is answerable for the servant's
negligence, which has caused an injury to another servant. We
consider the charge incorrect in both respects.
An: artisan charged with a duty of repairing, within the scope
of his handicraft, is not conclusively shown to have been negligent by a failure to remedy some defect, specifically pointed out
to him. He may have attempted to remedy it, and exhausted the
skill and care of his art, and yet from some defect in material, or
some other cause beyond the detection of ordinary caution and
care, may have failed to altogether cure the defect. The question of negligence in the mechanic was for the jury, upon the
indeterminate fact presented by the hypothesis of the charge.
The question remains, whether, if the mechanic charged with
repairing the engine, was negligent in failing to remedy the defeet, the defendant is liable for the injury alleged to have resulted
therefrom to the plaintiff. This question will arise upon another
trial, and must be decided: Is a railroad responsible to one of its
servants employed on a locomotive for an injury occasioned by
the negligence of others employed in its machine-shop?
This court has twice decided that "1when persons are- employed
by a common, employer in the same general business, and one of
them is injured by the negligence of the other, the employer is
not responsible therefor:" Cook & Scott v. Partam, 24 Ala. 21;
Walker v. Bolling, 25 Id. 294. Of this doctrine, it is said in the
former case, that it is too well established both upon English and
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American authority to be now controverted." The English authorities, without exception, support this ruling, and Judge REDFIELD, in whose mind some difficulty as to its justice and policy
was produced by the reasoning of a Scotch judge, withdraws serious objection to it, if taken with the qualification prescribed in
Wiggett v. Fox, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 486; Redfield on Railways
525, § 5, n. 15. That qualification is, that the master is answerable that the servants shall be persons of ordinary skill and care.
That qualification has been twice announced in this state. The
precise shape of its statement is, that it is the master's duty to
use due care in procuring competent servants or officers, and he
is responsible for a failure to discharge that duty: Cook v. Parham, 24 Ala. 21; Walker v. Bolling, 22 Id. 294. With this
qualification, the rule above stated, which prevails in England,
must be regarded as established in this state. This rule is supported by all the English cases and all the American, with a few
exceptions. Finding the question a res adjudicata in this court,
and the rule thus supported by authority, we might here stop the
discussion of the subject, but it will, perhaps, be more satisfactory to notice the meagre array of adverse authority. In Scotland the rule is opposite to that which prevails in England. That
rule imposes on the master a duty to his servant not only of furnishing "good and sufficient machinery," but of having "all acts
by others whom he employs, done properly and carefully." See
Dixon v. Bank-in, in the Court of Sessions, 1 Am. Railw. Oases
569. In point of authority we must prefer the adjudications of
the English to the Scotch courts, if their reasons were in equilibrium; but on account of the reasoning and principle which underlie the English rule, we regard it as much more consonant with
justice and public policy than the Scotch rule, which is built up
upon the idea of a partial absolution of a servant from the risks,
incident in the very nature of things, to his employment. In
Ohio" and Kentucky, the courts have engrafted upon the rule,
prevalent in England, and in most of our states, an exception of
the cases where the injured servant was subordinate in grade to,
and subject to the authority of the servant from whose negligence
the injury resulted: L21 1. B. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415; L.
, XN . B_. Co. v. Collins, 5 Am. L. Reg. 265; s. c. 1 Redfield
on R. 527, n. Judge REDFIELD, in a note to his work on Railways (1 vol. 532), remarks, in reference to that rule, that lie
VOL. XVUI.-
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should regard it as more salutary than the present, but admits
that the general current of authority is in the opposite direction.
Yet, in a previous note, p. 525, the learned author had said that
there seemed to be no serious objection to the English rule with
the qualification stated in Wiggitt v. Fox, 36 E. L. & E. 486. In
Indiana the rule has been adopted that the railroad is liable to a
servant for an injury to his fellow-servant, when they are employed
in different departments: Gillnwaterv. .' & IT . CJo., 5 Ind.
339; Fitzpatrick v. N. A. & ,S. B. Co., 7 Id. 436. In Wisconsin
the distinction made in Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana is repudiated,
and the court, boldly confiding in its own convictions, with the
oncouragement given by the Scotch authority, applies the dootrine of respondeat superior to the railroad company, where one
of its servants has been injured by the negligence of another:
Chamberlain v. ff. & H. B. B. Co., 11 Wis. 238. Scudder v.
Woodbridge, Kelly's (Ga.) R. 195, is not authority against the
English rule, which, as we have seen, is adopted in this state. On
the contrary it recognises the rule, but establishes upon principles
of humanity and of policy peculiar to the state of slavery, an
exception of cases of injury to slaves.
The proposition which bases the liability on the inferiority of
grade of the negligent servant, and the subordination to him of
the injured servant, is, in our judgment, not founded in adequate
reason. It can make no difference to the brakeman whether he
is injured by the carelessness of another brakeman in some remote
part of the train or of the engineer or conductor, nor can it make
any difference whether a fireman is injured by the negligence of
an engineer, who directs him, or the machinist who is charged with.
fitting the engine for the road. Protection is equally difficult to
the injured party in all of the cases. There can be no reason for
distinction in the nature of the employer's duty dependent upon
the relation of the injured and negligent parties. The employer's
obligation to his servant, in reference to fellow-servants, must be
the same in all those cases. If the corporation is regarded by
the law as present at what its servant does in one case it should
be so regarded in every other, qui facit per aliam, facit per se,
can be applied with no greater propriety in one case than another.
The maxim respondeat superior applied in favor of a servant
injured by a fellow-servant, in Priestlyv. Fowler, supra, is shown
to be unreasonable by an indisputable array of its absurd conse-
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quences. We need not reproduce them. The reasoning is conclusive, without the aid of the reductio ad alsurdum. The servant pays nothing for his transportation. He is compensated for
his service according to an agreed estimate of its value, in which
the element of its peril is considered. The master can do nothing
more for the safety of himself or his family and property than to be
careful to select competent and fit servants. To inflict a penalty
upon him for not doing more for his servant is unreasonable. As
long as human agencies shall be imperfect, accidents must be incident to every business requiring caution and diligence. When the
master has selected competent and fit agencies, those negligences
are but risks of the business, which the servant himself must take,
as the master is bound to do. After the employer has furnished
competent and fit employees, "theprevention of negligence on the
part of any one of them is certainly as much within the power of the
others as in that of the employer. Why then should the employer
be responsible to one for the negligence of another? Besides,
there is a principle of- public policy which underlies the rule.
The tendency of the rule is to quicken the zeal and vigilance of
servants to prevent the negligence of their fellow-servants and
avoid the consequences of it. The doctrine of respondeat superior
rests upon principles of public policy which have no application
here. Indeed, the rule of policy is reversed. The safety of the
public, which must trust to the employees of railroads, is best
consulted by impiessing upon each that his own interest is inseparably blended with the safety of the passengers; and he is
best stimulated to the utmost effort to prevent negligence in others,
and obviate their destructive consequences by the knowledge that
for injury sustained he hat no fedress save against the wrongdoer.
He would be an unwise guardian of the public weal, who would
relinquish any guaranty, however slight, of the fidelity and diligence of those agents who, beyond the sight of their employers,
guide the perilous and powerful machinery of railroad transportation. It is impossible for those who represent the legal personality of a corporation to otherwise secure complete and safe repairs
of defective engines than through the agency of competent and
proper mechanics. If it has employed the agency of such
mechanics in that duty, and no personal blame attached to it, it
will not be responsible, if a defect not remedied in consequence
of the negligence of such mechanic, shall have caused an injury
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to another servant.

Without commenting upon them, we refer to

the authorities collated by Judge REDFIELD, in his work on Railways, vol. 1, § 8, pp. 520, 543. We conclude that the second
charge was erroneous in deducing the liability of the defendant
from the failure of its servants to effectually repair the engine and
remedy a known defect, although there may have been no want
of proper care and diligence on the part of the defendant.
The third charge lays down alternative hypotheses, upon each
of which it asserts the defendant's liability. The charge upon
the former hypothesis is, that if the plaintiff was, by reason of a
defect in the engine, neither known to him, nor open to ordinary
observation, exposed to unusual risks, and received the injuries
complained of, and the defendant might have known of such
defect, by ordinary care, then the defendant is liable. Whether
this charge as an abstract proposition would be correct, if there
were no other facts in the case than those which it brings to view,
it is not necessary for us to decide. A charge in a suit on a promissory note, that the defendant is liable, if he executed the note,
may be very correct if there is no other evidence, but it would be
very incorrect if there were evidence conducing to show a payment.
If the charge here were otherwise correct, it is fatally defective,
because it excludes from the jury entirely the defensive matter
in the case. If the engine was defective, and it was placed in the
hands of competent and fit mechanics to repair, and the use of the
engine without a cure of the defect, when the plaintiff was injured,
was the result of the negligence of such mechanics, the defendant
would not be liable. .The court could not properly take from the
jury the consideration of the defence set up, in reference to which
there was evidence. For a like reason the latter proposition of
the charge is erroneous.
Another charge given made notice of a defect in the engine to
any agent of the defendant, no matter what might be the scope
of his agency, notice to the defendant. This charge was obviously erroneous. The principle which should govern in reference
to this subject is indicated' in our remarks upon the first charge.
The court also charged, that if the engines of the kind used in this
case were, owing to their make and construction, unsafe, and defendant had been running them for several years, it may be supposed
to have known that they were unsafe, and if the jury believe such
to be the facts, they must find for plaintiff. No steam-engine can

RAILROAD CO. v. TIIOMAS.

in strictness of language be absolutely safe, but the expression in
the charge is to be considered in reference to the nature of the
subject. If the defendant employed an engine from its make and
construction unsafe in that sense, and knew thereof, or would
have known thereof by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, it would be responsible to one of its servants for injuries
caused by such defect in make and construction, after it was
known, or ought to have been known to the defendant, if the
defect was not known to the plaintiff. But the charge infers a
knowledge of the unsafeness growing out of the make and construction from the use of such engines for several years. Certainly such use would be a circumstance which might be argued
to the jury on the question of notice, but the charge cannot be
correct, unless notice is a legal presumption from such use. We
do not think it is, and the charge is therefore erroneous. It might
be, peradventure, that in the use of the engines the unsafeness
had never been developed, and if so, the force of the fact would
be lessened if not destroyed.
The charges hereinbefore noticed were given by the court upon
the plaintiff's request. The court seems from the bill of exceptions to have given mero nwtu an additional charge, that if there
was a defect in the engine causing it to be dangerous to use, and
the company had notice thereof, it was the duty of the company to take steps to remedy such defect, and if such notice was
communicated to proper agents, who were authorized to receive
such notice, or whose duties were such that authority to receive
such notice would be within the proper scope of their duties and
agency, then such notice would be sufficient to charge the company with notice. A majority of the court deem this a fair and
correct statement of the law, except in so far as it directs that
notice to servants, whose duties were such that authority to
receive such notice would be within the proper scope of their
agency, is notice to the defendant. The question whether the
authority to receive notice of a fact was within the scope of the
aIuties of an agency is, upon ascertained facts, a question of law,
and should not be referred to the jury. The principle which
should govern this question is discussed in our remarks upon the
second charge. See also Angell & Ames on Corporations, § 305;
Story on Agency, § 140. JUDGE, J., thinks the entire charge
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unobjectionable; the other judges regard it as objectionable, for
the reason above stated.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

Court of Appeals of New York.
WILLIAM D. ROBINSON, RESPONDENT, v. THE INTERNATIONAL
LIFE ASSURANCE CO. OF LONDON, APPELLANT.
A local board of directors, established by a foreign corporation in New York,
under regulations of the statute of that state, no matter how complete its organ ization or how full itsauthority to transact business without consultation with its
principal, is still a mere agency, and not a distinct corporation.
Therefore a contract, as of insurance, made by this New York board with the
plaintiff, a citizen of Virginia, was the contract of the foreign corporation with
plaintiff, and the government of the foreign corporation being a neutral and having
recognised the government of the plaintiff as a belligerent, the contract was not
suspended by the civil war in America and payment of premiums to a sub-agent
of the corporation, at Richmond, was a valid payment to the corporation.
The sub-agent at Richmond was appointed by the board at New York, and before
the war had no authority to collect premiums until he was furnished with "renewal
receipts," issued by the New York board. After June 1861, commercial intercourse between New York and Richmond being interrupted by the war, it was
claimed by plaintiff that the sub-agent at Richmond had a verbal authority to
receive premiums without being furnished with renewal receipts. The jury having
found for plaintiff, this court must assume that there was such authority.
Such authority to receive payment implies authority to receive it in whatever
was regarded as money at the time and place -of payment. Confederate notes
being so regarded and being received in good faith by the agent were a valid
medium of payment, as between the plaintiff and the corporation.

THIS action was brought upon a policy of life assurance issued

by the defendant by its local board of directors in New York to
C. W. Macmurdo, December 8th 1845. The policy was in the
usual form of such instruments. The premium upon the insurance was regulafly paid by the assured, who was a resident of
Richmond, Virginia, to and including the month of June 1861.
After that down to the time of the decease of the insured, which
happened in October 1862, the amounts becoming due for premiums under. the policy were paid by the assured in what is
known as Confederate currency. All the payments were made
after the spring of 1858 to W. S. Cowardin, who was the defendant's agent at Richmond. le was appointed as such agent by
the defendant's general agents at the city of New York. And
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he received what were called renewal receipts, which were delivered to the insured from time to time for the premiums paid
upon his policy down to about the month of June 1861. These
renewal receipts were issued to the local agent by the general
agents at the city of New York, and constituted his authority to
receive the premiums. After June 1861, none of these receipts
were issued to the local agent. But from that time it was claimed
by the plaintiff that the premiums were received by the local
agent under a special authority verbally conferred, by which the
renewal receipts were from that time dispensed with. After the
decease of the insured, the proofs required by the policy were
furnished to the defendants, and the claim for payment was
assigned to the plaintiff. Upon the trial a verdict was recovered
by the plaintiff, and from the judgment entered upon it the defendant appealed.
J. IF. Gerard,Jr., for appellant.-The sub-agency at Richmond
was created by the New York board, and the London corporation
knew nothing of it, and had no privity with the agent.
The company had a double situs in London and in New York,
and the American branch was a separate and independent corporation as to business in the United States: The Jonge Xlassino,
5 0. Rob. 302; The Ann, 1 Dodson 221; The Antonio Johanna,
1 Wheat. 159; Elbers v. Ins. Go., 16 Johns. 128; Phillips on
Ins. 112, § 164; Society v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105, 131; People v.
Cent. Railroad, 33 How. Pr. 407; 1 Duer on Ins. 525. The
domicile of a party is the test of his national character: 2 Lawrence's Wheaton 559-569; McConnell v. Hector, 1 Bos. & Pull.
113; 1 Duer on Ins. 495; 1 Kent 85-88, 10th ed.; The Indian
Chief, 3 C. Rob. 12; The Venus, 8 Cranch 253; Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500; The Venice, 2 Wall. 275; The Trances, 8
Cranch 363; The _reundschaft, 4 Wheat. 105. This doctrine
prevails in the case of agency: The Anna catharina,4 C. Rob.
107; 1 Kent 87; The San Jose, 2 Gall. 268:
The state of war which existed made all parties resident in the
two sections, enemies in contemplation of law: Mrs. Alexander's
Cotton, 2 Wall. 404; The Hiawatha Cases, 2 Black 635; Griswvold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438; Blatchford's Prize Cases, I,
556; Act of July 13th 1861, 12 U. S. Stat. 257; Proclamation
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Aug. 16th 1861. The domicile of the defendant being in New
York, its national character for the time was that of an American
company, and all intercourse and business transactions between it
and the plaintiff or the sub-agent at Richmond were illegal and
void.
The state of war revoked the agency: Carver v. Lane, 1 E. D.
Smith 165; Lawrence's Wheaton 557; The Julia, 8 Cranch 181;
The Rapid, Id. 161; Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns. 57;
16 Id. 438; 1'Kent (10th ed.) 77; The William Bagaley, 5 Wall.
407; Honger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 584; Jecker v. Montgomery, 18
How. 110; Esposito v. Bowden, 7 E. & B. 788.
. A fortiori is the insurance of an enemy's goods, and particularly of his life, against public policy, and suspended during war,
if not avoided by the war: 1 Duer on Ins. 417; 8 Kent 255;
1 Phillips on Ins. (3d ed.) p. 104, § 149; Purtado v. Rogers, 8
Bos. & Pul. 191; Kellner v. Le lfesurier, 4 East 396; Gamba
v. Le .lfesurier, Id. 407; Brandon v. Curling, Id. 410.
Even if defendant be regarded as a neutral sojourning here, it
is against public policy to support this contract: 1 Duer on Ins.
623; People v. Cent. Railroad, 33 How. Pr. 407; Kennett v.
Chambers, 14 How. 39.
There was no evidence of express authority to take Confederate notes, and such authority cannot be implied. They were not
money, and an agent's authority to receive payment means in
money strictly: Matthews v. Hamilton, 23 Ill..470; Todd v. Reid,
4 B. & Aid. 210; Russell v. Bagley, Id. 395; Dunlap's Agency
280, 281; Partridge.v. Bank, 58 Eng. Com. Law 396; Grant v.
Norway, 73 Id. 457, 11 C. B. 457; Ontario Bank v. Lightbody,
13 Wend. 101; Taylor v.Robinson, 14 Cal. 396; Story on
Agency, § 98, 10 Barn. & Cress. 760; Barker v. Greenwood, 2
Y. & Coll. 415; 5 Mees. & Wels. 645; Howard v. Chapman,4
Car. & P. 508; 1 Starkie R. 233; Underwood v. Nichols, 17 C.
B. 239; Stewart v. Aberdeen, 4 Mees. & Wels. 211, 228.
Dealing in these notes was illegal, and no authority can be
implied to do an illegal act: Clark v. Bank, 3 Duer 241; Wright
v. Overall, 2 Coldwell 345; Craig v. Missouri, 4 Peters 410;
Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Id. 258.
-.

R. Robinson, for appellee.-The power of the agent to
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collect was not terminated by the war: Griswold v. Waddington,
15 Johns. 69; Clark v. 3korey, 10 Id. 69; Bell v. Chapman, 10
Id. 183; Buchanan v. Carey, 19 Id. 136; Conn. v. Penn., 1
Wash. C. 0. 524; .Dennistoun v. bnbrie, 3 Id. 396. The defendant is an -English company, and the authority of its agent
was not suspended by a war in which it was a neutral. The
question as to the kind of money the sub-agent received is entirely between him and his principal. He was not expected to
transmit the identicalnotes received to his principal.
This is a ease of an executed contract, and as to such the
courts have held that the payment in Confederate money will not
be disturbed: Phillips v. Hooker, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 40;
Turley v. Newell, Phillips N. C. Eq. Rep. 301; Green v. Sizer,
40 li. 530; .3Alrrell v. Jones, Id. 565; Henley v. Franklin,
3 Coldwell472; Brown v. Wylie, 2 W. Va. 509 ; Abbot v. Dermott,
34 Ga. 227.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-It
appeared by the evidence given upon the trial
of this cause that the defendant at the time of the issuing of the
policy in suit, and at all times since then, was an insurance corporation, created by an Act of the English Parliament, and as
that was its legal character, although it had complied with the
laws of this state, providing for the manner in which foreign
insurance companies may carry on and transact the business of
insurance within this state, it nevertheless still remained and continued an English corporation.
The law of this state, however, conferred authority upon the
defendant only to transact its business within the state of New
York. It could not, and did not, authorize or empower it to
appoint an agency or carry on its insurance within the state of
Virginia. Whatever it did in that respect was done by virtue
of the laws of comity of that state. And for that reason no particular reference will be required to the provisions of the statute
under which foreign insurance companies are permitted to carry
on the business of insurance in the state of New York.
It is sufficient for the purposes of this case to assume that the
defendant was lawfully engaged in that business in this state, and
that it had legally and properly created and maintained its agency
for that purpose. And that the agency here, by a proper exerDANIELS,
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cise of its authority, had appointed the agent at Richmond to
transact the business of the defendant and its New York agency
required to be done at that place.
But even these assumptions, added to the circumstance that the
defendant had organized a local board of directors at the city of
New York, having authority to issue policies and adjust losses
without consultation with the corporation itself, could not have
the effect of changing the nature of the corporation under which
all this was performed.
The board was organized and the agency was created by the
act and under the authority of the corporation. The local board
and the agency combined did not form or constitute a corporation,
but simply the local means or agency through which the corporation carried on and transacted its business in this country. When
the local board and agency issued a policy, collected a premium,
adjusted a loss, or appointed a subordinate agency, it was not
done for itself, but for the defendant. And the power exercised
in performing either, or all of those acts, was derived from and
used-for the defendant.
No matter how formal or complicated such a local organization
may be, it can only possess and exercise the power conferred by
its foreign charter and the laws of the state upon the corporation
itself. And when it makes use of such powers, it does so not as
an independent body or in the nature of a subsisting corporation,
but as an agency merely of the corporation under which such
organization may have been effected. This is entirely apparent
from the facts, that without the charter and the laws of the state
relating to such corporation, the local board could be neither
regularly organized or acquire the power of acting at all. And
in case these laws were repealed and- the charter were withdrawn,
or the corporation were otherwise dissolved, the local board and
agency would necessarily from that time cease to exist. It is not
intended to be affirmed that the right of foreign corporations to
transact business in this state is absolutely dependent upon the
existence of some statutory regulation in their favor, but only
that the transaction of such business is dependent upon a compliance with the provisions of -those statutes while they may be
maintained by the legislative authority of the state.
But it is maintained that while these laws are in existence a
compliance with their requirements, whether it be by a mere
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agency, properly so called, or by a local board of direction having a general charge and control over the American business of
the corporation without any immediate dictation or control from
the corporation itself, constitutes in fact, as well as in law, a mere
agency, and nothing beyond that.
And this is insufficient to change the domiciliary nature of the
corporation itself under whose power and authority, whether
acquired by its foreign charter or the laws of the state relating
to foreign insurance companies doing business here, this formal as
well as efficient organization may have taken place. This organization was merely the medium through which the defendant carried on or transacted its American insurance business, the means
through which it was done; not the body itself which did that
business. Accordingly, where insurances were made, as is shown
by the policy issued in this instance, it was the defendant that
made the insurance and was to receive the premium for it, and
pay the loss arising under it, and not the agency and board of
directors existing in the city of New York. It is true, the money
would pass into the hands of the local agency and under the control of the local board, when premiums were paid, and from them
in the payment of losses accepted and adjusted by them; but
still it would be all the time received and disbursed as the money
of the defendant, in whose behalf and under whose authority the
local board and agency alone had the power of aciing.
As the contract of insurance made in this case was necessarily
the contract of the defendant, therefore, when the war, or Southern insurrection, arose, it was not one which existed between a
loyal citizen and a rebel, but of necessity between a neutral and a
rebel, recognised by the defendant's government as a belligerent.
*And recognition, although not binding upon or adopted in a
friendly spirit to the government of the United States, was binding and controlling as authority upon the defendant. As a contraet between a neutral and a rebel, or, as the defendant's government designated him, a belligerent, it was neither annulled nor
suspended by the proclamation of the President or the laws of
Congress, for they were not expressly or by necessary implication
made applicable to cases of that character. The plaintiff was not
therefore prevented from maintaining this action by anything
rendering the insurance illegal which was effected in this case.
But by the terms of the policy, the right of the assured to
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depend upon it as an insurance was rendered conditional upon
the performance of the stipulations requiring payment of the premiums. By the written appointment of the agent at Richmond,
no authority was conferred upon him to receive payment of insurance premiums. That appears to have been derived from what
were called renewal receipts, which were forwarded from the
agency-at New York to the local agent, and by him delivered to
the assured as the premiums were paid. Even this practice was
discontinued After the early part of the year 1861. This discontinuance did not arise out of any disposition manifested by any
act of the defendant, or the New York agency, to terminate its
15olicies or to decline payment of its premiums, but on account
of their inability to communicate readily with the local agent at
Richmond. When it took place, the means of carrying on such
communications had been interrupted and suspended by the insurrection. The facilities before that time supplied by the mails and
express companies traversing the country had necessarily been
withdrawn on account of the hostile and dangerous condition of
the Southern States, and the only remaining means of communication was that which was supplied by individuals occasionally
passing around or through the lines of military forces.
The agency at New York appears to have been of the most
complete and general character, but still, as already shown, merely
an agency. It therefore had the power to create and appoint
subordinate agencies, wherever in its judgment the business of the
defendant required them to be located. And this it could do
either by writing or by parol. And when the appointment was
made by writing and nothing limiting the action of the local
agency was contained in it, the power of the local agent could
afterwards without any legal impropriety be enlarged by parol.
In this respect the New York agency was unrestricted by any
limitations placed upon its action by the defendant, or the instruments used by itself for the creation of the subordinate local
agency.
For while the written power of appointment issued to Cowardin
in this case conferred certain authority upon him as agent for the
defendant, not as agent for the. New York agency at the city of
Richmond, it contained nothing preventing additional authority
being given to him, either by the New York agency or by the
defendant itself. Neither was anything of that nature contained
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in the renewal receipts. For by the printed instructions issued
to him by the New York agency he was only prohibited from
receiving premiums without a regular renewal receipt, in the
absence of special authority for acting otherwise from the New
York office. This agency could therefore authorize the subordinate agency to receive the premiums accruing on the defendant's
policies without supplying him with renewal receipts for that pur'pose. And in the condition of the country, after the premium
was paid in June 1861, which rendered the transmission of these
renewal receipts impracticable, it was claimed on the part of the
plaintiff that such authority was actually conferred.
Evidence was given on the trial tending to substantiate this
claim, and on the part of the defendant to resist it. This evidence
was of a conflicting nature, and as it was fairly submitted to the
jury this court at the present time has no power to interfere with
their conclusion upon that subject. They have found that the
authority was conferred, substantially, of course, as the evidence
on the part of the plaintiff tended to establish it. And if it
was, it amounted to a general authority to the local agent at
Richmond to receive the premiums without renewal receipts and
without specific directions as to what he should receive them in.
It was therefore a general authority to him to collect the premiums accruing in the defendant's favor upon the policies which
it had previously issued. And this authority, under the well-settled principles of the law of agency, the agent became bound to
his principal to make use of according to the ordinary course of
the business he was employed in. and the settled usages, if any
were found to exist, relating to the subject. He could not, therefore, bind his principal or satisfy the powers of his agency by
accepting property for the premiums, for that would convert the
power to receive payment merely into an authority to traffic in
merchandise.
But from the nature of the power to receive payment the agent
necessarily derived the authority to accept whatever was generally
used for the purpose of making payments in the locality where
the debts were to be collected. As it has turned out, it would
have been more profitable for the principal if the agent had collected the premium upon this insurance in gold .coin or treasury
notes of the United States. But where this authority to collect
the premiums was exercised, it appears from the evidence that it
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could not be either conveniently or effectively used in that manner,
for gold was shown to have disappeared almost entirely from circulation, and it is a matter of history that the insurrectionary
authorities discountenanced the use of United States treasury
notes. When this authority was given, which the jury have found
was conferred upon the agent at Richmond, there was no immediate indication that any further opportunity would be afforded
for communicating with him while hostile relations existed between
the government and the rebel states.
And it must therefore have been designed for his guide under
.circumstances at that time not fully anticipated or comprehended.
The end to be obtained by the use and exercise of the authority
was to be the payment of the indebtedness accruing to the defendant. . And if circumstances should arise requiring the exercise of
judgment and discretion in making the collection, it must have
been intended that this agent should determine such matters for
himself on account of the impracticability of communicating
either with the defendant or the general agency located here for
the procurement of special directions. Such emergencies must,
from the nature of the times, have been necessarily within the
'expectation of .the general agency, and when they arose afterwards it was the duty of the special agent to determine upon the
best mode of securing the object of his principal under the circumstances. His duty as well as his authority vas to collect the
debts maturing in favor of the defendant. How that could best
be done was necessarily left to his own prudence and judgment
when the changes ii the times rendered a determination upon that
point indispensable to the exercise of his authority.
That such changes did arise is clearly shown by the evidence.
For soon after the agent at Richmond was directed to collect the
premiums without renewal receipts the actual currency of that
locality was supplanted by Confederate notes of the insurrectionary government. Although not made a legal tender for the
payment of debts, all other species of currency were soon driven
out of circulation by them. And after that they were the financial means used for buying and selling property, and for creating
and discharging debts. And while that was their character, and the
premium upon gold and foreign exchange was not far above them,
they were received by this agent in payment of the premiums due
on this insurance.
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The uncontradicted evidence given in the case is that these
notes were issued soon after the passage of the act providing for
them, which was on the 19th of August 1861.
And from that time they passed as of equal value with banknotes, and during the residue of 1861 and through 1862, they
were known as Confederate money and passed almost at par at
Richmond. The acceptance of this currency as payment of the
premiums upon the policy in suit, spurious and unlawful as the
currency itself was, very materially differed from the acceptance
of payment in property or in counterfeit notes or the notes of
insolvent banks. For the acceptance of property was not within
the spirit or scope of the agency, and the bills of insolvent banks
and counterfeit notes would be wholly devoid of value and therefore no payment whatever in any just sense of that term. But
these notes were not of that description, for they had a circulating
value at-the time the agent received them, and were used for all
the ordinary purposes of currency. While in that condition he
received them as payment, and from the hopeful account given by
him of the prospects of the Confederacy, contained in his letter
of June 1861, he undoubtedly did so in good faith, believing he
was-promoting his principal's interests by doing so. From the
nature of the power which the jury have necessarily found was
conferred upon him, the circumstances that must have been expected to attend the execution of it, the emergen~y he afterwards
encountered, when the previous currency of his state was practically excluded from circulation by that which was issued by the
Confederate authorities, the premiums upon this policy were in judgment of law paid when the defendant's agent received the amount
due for them in these notes. It was the only possible mode under
the circumstances existing at that time in which the premiums
could be collected by him, and as it had been made his duty to
obtain their payment, he was necessarily authorized to receive it
in that manner.
But even if that authority were not a necessary incident of the
power conferred upon him, still as he was authorized to collect the
premiums, his acceptance of Confederate notes for the amount of
them discharged the assured. For under the circumstances existing
at the time when the authority to collect was coliferred upon him,
it could neither have been expected nor intended that the identical
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currency received by him should be remitted to the general agency
at the city of New York.
This currency, although valuable at Richmond, was worthless
at New York. The only mode, therefore, in which the value it
had at Richmond could be transmitted to New York was by purchasing gold or foreign exchange with it, and it appears from the
evidence that it was capable of being so used. In addition to
this, the course of business previously established between the
New York and the Richmond agency, was for the agent at the
latter place to make up his accounts and remit his collections once
in each month, which was inconsistent with the obligation or expectation that the identical moneys received by him were to be
remitted to the agency at New York. On the contrary, the notorious and general course of business in cases of that description
was to purchase exchange with the local currency, and in that
manner transmit its value to the place to which it was to be forwarded.
Not only the state of public affairs, but the customary mode
showh to have been adopted in the transaction of this business
also, indicate that it could not have been intended that the local
currency used and received for the payment of debts at Richmond
should be remitted in kind to New York. On the contrary, this
was received for the convenient transaction of the business at the
place where it fulfilled all the purposes and offices of a monetary
currency. And accompanying its receipt was the corresponding
duty to invest it in such funds or commercial paper as would
enable him to transmit its local value to the general agents, whose
business was carried on at a place where that local value had no
existence.
Under this relation and obligation of the local agent, he became
the defendant's debtor for the value of the Confederate currency
at the time and place when and where it was received by him.
And that obligation can only be effectually discharged by transmitting or paying that value in lawful money or its equivalent to
the defendant's general agents at the city of New York.
By the acceptance of the premiums in Confederate notes the
agent discharged the assured, but at the same time, under his obligations arising out of the peculiar circumstances of the case and
the previous course of business between himself and the defendwit's general agency, he became the defendant's debtor for the

